In this paper, we present new blind signature schemes based on the factorization problem.
1 Introduction
Electronic cash and blind signatures
In 1952, David Chaum's [S] pioneering work was devoted to create an electronic version of money. To this aim, he introduced the notions of "coins" and "randomized blind signatures" (or simply "blind signatures"). He claimed that it WAS the only one way to ensure anonymity. In fact, in real life, a coin cannot be easily traced from the bank to the shop. Furthermore, two spendings of a same user cannot be linked together. These are two privacy properties of real coins that Chaum wanted to obtain: untraceability and unlinkability. In his first scheme, Chaum used blind signatures for the production of coins. The user makes the Bank sign, blindly, a coin. Then the user is in possession of a valid coin that the Bank itself cannot recognize nor link with the user. When the user spends the coin, the shop immediately returns it to the Bank. If the coin has already been spent, the Bank det.ects it and informs the shop so that it refuses payment. It is an "on-line" context. There is a continuous communication between the shop and the Bank in order to verify the validity of coins. For this scheme, Chaum defined the fist blind signature, based on the RSA hypothesis. l The Bank has a large composite number n, a public key e, and a related secret key d. It also uses a public hash function H. l A coin is the concatenation of a number p, and its signature by the Bank. In order to ensure untraccability, the user needs a signature that the Bank won't bc! able to recognize later. He "blinds" it wit.1~ a random value re mod n, and sends m = H(p)r' mod n t.o the In this scheme, all coins have the same value, but in a rcnl system, different values might be encoded by different cxponents e.
in an "off-line" context, we cannot prevent, a user from spending twice or more a coin. This fraud is called "doublcspending", or more generally iLover-spendingn. The only thing we can do is to discover the double-spender and punish him. Chaum, Fiat and Naor [9] opened a way in this tlirection by introducing the identity in t,he coin in such a way that it remains concealed, unless double spending happens. One more time, blind signatures were a critical point fol anonymity, and as before, the authors used t.he blind RSA signature, together with the "cut-and-choose" tcchniquc :
l The Bank has a large composite number n, a public key e = 3, and a secret key d, t.he inverse of 3 moclulo q(n). It uses two public two-paramet,ers one-way functions f and g. Furthermore, for each i, zi = g(oi, ct) and gr = g(b,, C, @ I), where aI, L, and ci are random values, and I is the idcnt.ity of the IIHCI'.
l To spend such a coin, Alice receives a "challcn~c?' d E {O,l}" from the shopkeeper, Bob.
For carh i,
Alice returns an answer. In case d, = 0, Alice sends a,, cI and yt, and Bob can compute xi = g(ai, c,) and T, = f(x%, yt). In case d, = 1, Alice sends b,, cc $ I and x,, and Bob can compute y, = g(bi, ct $ I) and T$= f(.r,, yi). Then he checks whether the equality ?r= n T* mod n is satisfied. Only the Bank could have produced such a product.
l In case of double-spending, with high probability, two different challenges are asked. This means that there esists i such t.hat d, # d:. Then AIice has to reveal ci and ct @ I, therefore anonymity disappears.
l To allow det,ection of double-spending, the coin has to respect hhe previous described form. In particular, the identity I must be correct. An attacker has no reason to be honest and may not follow the rules. The Bank has to cont,rol the structure of the coins. To do so, the Bank asks Alice to produce 2L numbers t,, during this communication, the Bank chooses b of them to control the sbructure. Those values are no longer anonymous so t,hat Alice throws them away and computes the coins with the b other values. The probability for a cheater t.o fmally be in possession of a fraudulous coin is about 2-*".
The problem of t.he "cut-and-choose" technique is that coins are very large, as well as the amount of computations. Then, in 1993, Ferguson [12] and Brands [3] proposed new schemes without "cut-and-choose".
The fist one use once again t.he blind RSA signature whereas the Brands' scheme uses a new blind signature derived from the Schnorr's signat,ure scheme f11] :
l Two large prime integers p and q are given such that q 1 p -1. They are published t.ogether with an element g of (Z/pZ)* of order q.
l The signer creates a pair of keys, I E Z/qZ, the secret one, and y = 9-I mod p, the public one. He publishes Y.
l The signature of a secret message m is obtained as follows: First, Alice asks t,he signer to initiate a communication. The signer chooses a random k E Z/qZ, computes and sends the "commitment" r = g' mod p. Then, Alice blinds this value with two random elements a,d E Z/qZ, into r' = rgBays8 mod p, and computes the value e' = H(m, r') mod q. She sends the "challenge" e = e' + p mod q to the signer who ret,urns the value .s such that g"ye = r mod p. Finally, she computes s' = s -cr mod q. This way, (e', s') is a valid Schnorr signature of m since it satisfies e' = H(m,g"'y" mod p).
In bot,h schemes, Ferguson and Brands manage to hide the identity of t.he user in coins, in such a way it is revealed after a double-spending, without any kind of "cutand-choose" methodology. Many extensions [ll, 2, 61 , attacks [4, 71 and repairs [5, 221 have been proposed. AlI of them use blind signatures, and the security of proposed schemes is totally dependent of the security of the blind signat,ures used. Surprisingly, no security proofs have been proposed for those blind signatures. [16] . Furthermore their definition of security directly comes from electronic cash applications. They define two notions, the "one-more forgery" under "sequential" and "parallel" attacks (see figure 1 ).
Definition 1 (The "one-more forgery").
For any fixed e, if an attacker A is able to compute, after E interactions with the signer C, a+ 1 signatures with non-negligible probability, we say that it has performed an (E, C + l)-forgery. A "one-more forgery" is an (e, C+ l)-forgery for some integer L.
This definition comes from the natural property needed for any electronic cash system: if the Bank helps Alice to produce f? coins, then, after those interactions Alice must not hold more than fJ coins. The Bank wants to be sure of the amount of money in circulation.
Definition2
(Attacks). Two different attacks can be considered:
l the sequential attack where the attacker sequentially interacts with the signer.
l the parallel attack where the attacker can interact e times with the signer and send the challenges whenever he wants. This attack is stronger. Indeed, the attacker can initiate new interactions with the signer before previous ones have been completed. Furthermore, the sequential attack is a particular case of the parallel one. Those definitions are related with the two scenarios for withdrawing money. We can assume that the Bank has only one communication line and cannot produce more than one coin at the same time. It is a great constraint for users and for attackers too. A much more suitable situation is the possibility to withdraw many coins at the same time, in parallel. This property can be used by the attacker.
Previous results
The technique used by Pointcheval and Stern [18] for their proof can be apphed on both "witness indistinguishable" adaptations of Okamoto because, in both schemes, public keys have many secret keys associated. The results are given in the so-called "random oracle model" formalized by Bellare and Rogaway [I] . They simply assume that hash functions are really random, but this is now a current assumption. Theorem 3. Consider the Okamoto -Schnorr blind signature scheme (see figure 2) in the random oracle model. A 'one-more forgery", even under a parallel attack, is eqtrivalent to the discrete logarithm problem in a subgroup.
TheoremA.
Consider the Okamoto -Guillou-Quisquater blind signature scheme (see figure 3) in the random oracle model. A "one-more forgery", even under a parallel attack, is equivalent to the RSA problem.
A new scheme
As we see, the provably secure schemes already known are related to the discrete logarithm problem or to RSA. In search for a scheme with the same security level as factorization, we consider the well-known "witness indistinguishable" protocol of Fiat-Shamir [13] with multiple secrets presented on figure 4 .
On figure 5 , the blind signature adapted from the FiatShamir identification scheme appears. For this new scheme, with a slightly more technical proof than the one given by Pointcheval and Stern [18], we could obtain the following result. 
Proof (sketch).
For the proof, we can present an efficient transformation of an attacker who performs a "one-more forgery" into an algorithm which factorizes Blum integers. A Blum integer N is a product of two primes p and q equal to 3 modulo 4. The property of such integers is that in (Z/NZ)*, 1 has four square roots, Te = 1, Tr = T, TZ = -1 and Ts = -T, and among these square roots, 1 is the only one to be a square. These square roots define a residuosity function C: for any z E (Z/NZ)*, C(X) = i such that T,/z is a square. We also define the binary residuosity, by ~(2) = C(Z) mod 2. This function satisfies the relation, for any 2, y E (Z!!/NZ)*, I = ~(52 @J qty). Furthermore, if we know z and y such that (1: = y mod N with ~(2) # q(y), then gcd(z -y, N) E (p, q} and thus we can factor N.
We assume we have an attacker A who succeeds, in his "one-more forgery", with non-negligible probability. Thus, there exists an integer e such that after e interactions with the authority, (Zi,ei, yi) for i E (1,. , . ,1}, and Q queries asked to the hash function, &I, . , . , &s, A returns .! -I-1 valid signatures, (mi, air sip pi) for i = 1,. . . , C + 1. Those signatures can be seen as valid coins which satisfy j=k CY, = rJq-J& -pj mod N.
Jt=l
We will create random secret keys, compute the associat.ed public keys and finally use this attacker to find two 94 square roots z and y of a single element with distinct binary residuosity, q(z) # q(y).
Let (S,),efr,k) be such random secret keys. Changing their sign, we can assume that thay are between 0 and N/2, This does not change the binary residuosity. We comput,c the squares V,. We denote by r the bit string defined by r3 = q(S,) for j = 1,. . . , k. It is easy to remark that an attack is characterized by the random tapes of the at,tackcr, w, and of the signer, 0, by the V, and r, and by t*he hash function f. We will group w, and the 15 under variable Y. The random tape fl only defines the tJ t,hat WC regroup under the variable r.
We play the attack (~,r,r,f) and obtain valid signatures (mi, air cir pi) for i = 1,. . . ,fJ + 1. Because of the unpredictability of the images off, if the signatures arc valid, we can assume that for each i, there exist,s and index Znd, such that &In& = (mi,(Yr). We choose a random i and play again the attack with V, r, r and a hash funct,ion /' whose answers are the same as those of f but for &I,,~[ , QInd,+l > *. . > using the "'oracle replay" technique [19] ,]. Mfe will not detail the proof, but with non-negligible probability, we obtain another success with Qind, = (m,,cu,), but
Because of their validity, both ith signatures satisfy
By an easy division, we obtain
We only have to hope that where @ is the dot product modulo 2. We thus define, for each i, the variable xi(V, r, 7, f) = (et 0 r) @ n(p,). The main question we have to study is whether or not, t,hc random variable xi is sensitive to queries asked at sbeps Incl,, Indi + 1, etc. We expect that the answer is yes. Following the idea of the Pointcheval and Stern's proof, we can define the following transformations:
Definition 6. For any j E (1,. . . , k}, we den0t.c by a, the transformation which maps any quadruple (v, r, T, f) to (v, r', T', f), where r' = 7-l.. .r3-lF,rJ+l . . .rk 7' = (ti,..., ti) with ti = t,T"nl mod N.
One can verify that executions corresponding to (11, I(, r, J) and @,(I+ r, 7, f) for any j are the same with respect. to the view of the user. From this point,, using a similar technique as Pointcheval and Stern [18] but with t.he k transformations @,, we can prove that their exists an index i such that the random variable xi is sensitive to queries asked at steps Indi, Indi + 1, etc. 
.;"<.-,,,.'
Then, if we have guessed the good index i, with non negligible probability me obtain two elements z = p* -I II S, mod N c*,J=l I 2 = P',' rJ S, mod N, c' =l r.1 such that. :2 = z12 mod N and v(z) # I, which concludes the proof. A much more complete proof will be given in the full paper. cl
Extensions
Since the appearance of the Fiat-Shamir identification, several variants have been proposed. The most well known are those of Guillou-Quisquater [14, 151 and Ong-Schnorr [17] . They are bot.h estensions with exponents greater than 2 in order to reduce the amount of interactions. Guillou and Quisquat,er more or less suggested that the exponent has to be prime and to not divide the order of the mukiplication group, q(N) = (p -l)(q -1). Their protocol becomes equivalent t.o RSA. Ong and S&non-suggested to use exponents of t.he form 2", which are clearly not prime nor prime 1vit.h q(N).
Recently, Shoup [23] proved that the Ong-Schnorr scheme with large exponents L is secure against, active attacks if N is a Blum integer. This scheme can be easily t,ransformed for blind signatures, as presented on figure 6. About t,his new and efficient blind signature scheme me can say: and z2 = (S'")" mod N. Then, we can remark that z is a quadratic residu, and S'" has a random residuosity (the same as S'). With probability of an half, S'" and z provide a factor of N. 0
We must remark that the proof only provides the security against sequential attacks because of the simulator which succeeds in the signature with a polynomially small probability. Furthermore, the reduction has a polynomial but very large complexity. Nevertheless, the scheme admits a proof of security that very few schemes have.
Conclusion
Our new blind signature schemes are the first ones to be proved as secure as factorization. Because of the importance of blind signatures in electronic cash systems, those schemes may open new ways to build secure Ecash protocols. According to the prevailing scenario, one can use the Fiat-Shamir blind signature scheme if the security against parallel attacks is needed, or the much more efficient OngSchnorr blind signature scheme if securit.y against sequential attacks is enough.
